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Preface 
This text is a revised and expanded version of a speech held at Stellenbosch 
University on 20 January 2011, at the occasion of assuming my new position at the 
Centre for Chinese Studies (CCS). It is meant to provide some overall direction for 
future research at the CCS – and to provide some clues on where I would see points 
for engagement with other research institutions in Africa, China or elsewhere on the 
matter of Chinese engagement in Africa.  
This paper also constitutes a new publication format of the Centre for Chinese 
Studies; it is the first CCS discussion paper. This format is meant for contribution 
that fall into the mandate of the CCS: discussion papers should contribute to the 
academic debate on China‟s global rise and the consequences thereof for African 
development. We do therefore explicitly invite scholars from Africa, China, or 
elsewhere, to use this format for advanced papers that are ready for an initial 
publication, not least to obtain input from other colleagues in the field. Discussion 
papers should thus be seen as work in progress, exposed to (and ideally stimulating) 
policy-relevant discussion based on academic standards.    
Thanks go to Garth le Pere for comments during the presentation in early 2011, as 
well as Scarlett Cornelissen , and colleagues from the department of political sciences 
at Stellenbosch University. I also appreciated and benefited from comments made by 
those present at the speech in Stellenbosch in late January 2011. Last, but not least,  I 
would like to express my thanks to my colleagues at the CCS, Sanne van der Lugt, 
Matthew McDonald, and Bronwyn Grobler, for their continuous support and critical 
engagement. 
 
Sven Grimm,  
Stellenbosch, June 2011  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This paper explores the changing nature of Chinese-African relations in the early 21st 
century and, in a second step, assesses Chinese responsibilities for African 
development.  
Sino-African relations have profoundly changed in character as a consequence of 
economic policy shifts in China, coming with readjustments in Chinese foreign 
policy. China is an emerging world power – and increasingly an important partner to 
African states. The Asian engagement in Africa is not new, and we have seen a small 
wave of literature on Chinese engagement already in the mid-1970s to early 1980s. 
Chinese government engagement in Africa is a constant feature since the days of 
Mao Zedong. Yet, China‟s engagement with Africa with regard to trade, investments, 
assistance, and – not least – diplomatic activities has been increasing tremendously 
since 2000. Sino-African relations are becoming more important in their own right, 
but also as a consequence of the global rise of China. The recent global economic 
crisis has arguably further accelerated the already rapid change in economic weights 
in the world, making the shift towards Asia more pronounced.  
China‟s relationship with Africa is unequal, whatever the rhetoric around it. China is 
currently the second biggest economy in the world and it is likely to become even 
stronger, gaining (or regain, in a historical perspective) global economic weight within 
the next decade or so. One emerging economy, China, is in need of resources and 
markets as well as political backing for its peaceful global rise on the one side. And 
on the other side, we find 49 African states with rather small and often fragile 
economies engaging with China and other external powers.  
The stark inequality in economic and political weights results in Chinese 
responsibilities for African development, this paper argues, which is distinct from 
tutelage or undue interference. While China emphasises its very distinctness from 
„traditional donors‟ – not least so as this is arguably a cornerstone in its „soft power‟ 
in Africa – some challenges are, in fact, arising to African economies or societies 
from China‟s very size. Action as well as inaction in Chinese international and 
domestic policies will have consequences for development in other parts of the 
world, not least in Africa. Research on Chinese-African relations is thus quickly 
becoming similar to the research on other great powers‟ relations with Africa, even if 
China is both, a great power and a developing country.  
This paper provides an overview what we know about effects of Chinese engagement 
on Africa. The diversity of the African setting in mind, this paper will refer to 
individual cases as examples, aspiring to provide an overview without unduly 
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generalising. The paper aspires to cast a light on aspects where China‟s rise impacts 
on African development and which we do currently not know enough about.  
How immediate or intermediate are the effects of Chinese engagement? Which actors 
do we have to take into account when we speak of „China‟ as one entity – and who 
exactly in China has to take responsibilities for African development?  
The paper explores the state of debate on direct and indirect effects of China‟s global 
rise on African states and aims at identifying areas of responsibilities for China and 
for African governments. In conclusion, it casts a light on the policy requirements 
for African states in their engagement with external powers and gives indications of a 
research agenda on China‟s growing global reach.   
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INTRODUCTION  
For a little less than a decade now, China‟s engagement in Africa is a hotly debated 
topic, debates in the public ranging from „China as the new colonial power‟ to „China 
the model and saviour‟. The story about threats can more often than not be read in 
the Media; we could find several cover stories in 2010 in The Economist (UK), Der 
Spiegel (Germany), or other Western/Northern media, denouncing what they saw as 
„neo-colonial‟ features in China‟s „African safari‟ (as journalists like to describe it in 
exotic terms). The story about „China the saviour‟, for its part, is often rather linked 
to debates about Western development assistance, be they used by political actors in 
Africa or more on the polemic publications‟ side (e.g. Moyo 2009). Why would we 
have to discuss Chinese responsibilities for development in Africa, more than 50 
years after African independences? Why holding yet another external actor 
„responsible‟ for African political and economic choices? The key argument of this 
discussion paper is not that of limited (or mere external) sovereignty of African states 
(Clapham 1996). Neither is China analysed as a „neo-colonial power‟ in this paper. 
Rather, the starting point is the fact that Chinese growth and its political rise is of a 
different quality than that of Japan or Korea in the 1970s or 1980s.  
The rise of China in the 21st century is an important change, called by some a 
„tectonic shift‟ in global economics and politics (Kaplinsky/Messner 2007). Despite 
being a developing country and still being home to “as many as 150 million Chinese 
[…] actually living on less than $1.25 a day and […] regarded as poor by the 
internationally accepted guidelines of the World Bank” (China Daily, 28/10/2010), 
China is globally important and crucial for problem solving. Global power is not 
exclusively linked to the level of wealth in a society; China might still be poor, but it 
is also, and increasingly so, powerful (Humphrey/Messner 2008).  
China should be neither vilified nor does it merit to be put on a pedestal; it can, as 
will be argued, indeed be made an ally to African development. At the same time, and 
not always to Chinese government‟s volition, the emerging Asian global power also 
has indirect and adverse effects on prospects in Africa. The official rhetoric from 
Beijing is spreading positive news on Sino-African „friendship‟. As much as we might 
crave for positive news, it is highly unlikely that all Chinese endeavours appear to be 
crowned with success. And indirect effects are hardly discussed in the official 
Chinese perspective. Given the mere size of its economy, its global connectedness 
and consequently its global importance, China will have some indirect effects on 
other developing nations, as has been argued (Kapliniski et a. 2006). Even if we 
assume an approach in Beijing that aims at being fully supportive of African 
development needs, policies will still have to be balanced with other, internal agendas 
in China. Direct and indirect effects of China‟s rise will have to be jointly managed if 
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African development is not to be stifled. This is not an easy task – for either side - 
and it is a task for which research is important.  
As a word of caution: we are often still looking at growth rates and potentials1, but it 
gives impressive growth rates and subsequently arising influence to China as another 
external power in Africa. Even if the OECD world remains of overwhelming 
relevance to African states: Non-Western economies have taken another leap in 
global importance, particularly when exploring the levels of investment in Africa. The 
real effects begin to be felt on the ground. Not least the indirect effects make China a 
topic of research across the globe, similar to other great powers. Putting China into 
context of other world powers will not always sit easily with the official Chinese 
position of its engagement being of an entirely different nature than Western powers, 
thus creating a narrative of „Chinese exceptionalism‟. This narrative might be deemed 
necessary in order to create some force of attraction to China, in other words: to 
generate „soft power‟ (Nye 2004; cf. also Fijałkowski 2011) for a Chinese engagement 
that often seems to be regarded as a competition with Western states‟ and/or 
companies‟ engagements. It should, however, encourage researchers to look behind 
the rhetoric and challenge the assumptions, be they simplistically optimistic or unduly 
sceptical.  
Research on China is no luxury for „ivory tower academics‟ in Sub-Saharan Africa; 
there is a need for policy-relevance research to better understand an emerging partner 
to the continent. „China in Africa‟ and the multiple facets of this relationship remains 
a topic that is arguably still over-commentated, but under-researched (cf. Large 
2008). China‟s global rise is often assessed by looking at the engagement beyond its 
own region, not least so in Africa – yet, field research on the cooperation between 
China and specific countries is scarcer and much more recent (cf. Davies 2008; CCS 
2009; Brautigam 2009; Hackenesch 2011; Grimm et al. 2011). We need to know 
more about Chinese policy-making towards Africa and its drivers. There is a variety 
of actors and consequently a variety of agendas and perspectives that needs to be 
understood. Research on the empirical reality of direct Chinese engagement with 
Africa will need to be conducted in African states and in China itself. It is promising 
for a more substantial debate in the future that numerous PhD theses are currently 
being written on the Chinese policy-making towards and engagement with Africa, 
many of them based on case studies. 
                                                             
1 This does not necessarily result in a „take-over‟ by China (figures do not allow for such an 
interpretation. Investment figures by actors from the EU or from the USA are still 
substantially bigger, not least so when looking at FDI stocks. China is starting from a low 
basis, even if with impressive growth rates (cf. van der Lugt et al. 2011).   
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This paper aspires to be a contribution to an evidence-based debate that, one might 
argue, has actually just started to diversify beyond the initial „shock and awe‟ and that 
is gaining in scope and depth in African academia. We will have a look at what we 
currently know about direct and indirect, positive and negative consequences of 
Chinese engagement with Africa. From this basis, where can we argue for a Chinese 
responsibility in shaping the relations – and where are claims of a Chinese 
responsibility going overboard?  
 
CHINA IN AFRICA –  THE GLOBAL CONTEXT  
It should not be overlooked that Africa does not grow or stagnate exclusively due to 
external factors. Let‟s first turn to the African perspective on global trends, before 
looking at Sino-African relations in a historical perspective and with regard to current 
policy discussions in Western countries and China.  
A  GOOD DECADE FOR AFRICA –  DEVELOPMENT ,  COURTESY OF CHINA? 
In terms of economic growth, the first decade of the 21st century was a good decade 
for many African countries: an average growth rate in its domestic gross product of 
almost 6 per cent between 2001 and 2008, was “the strongest consistent performance 
since the early 1970s” (Soko/Lehmann 2011: 101). In the wording of the British 
magazine The Economist, African “lion kings” compare well to “Asian tigers” with 
regard to growth rates (6 January 2011). Among the global top 10 performers in 2011 
to 2015, The Economist believes, will feature: Ethiopia, Mozambique, Tanzania, 
Congo, Ghana, Zambia and Nigeria (see table 1).  
 
Table 1: “Go south, young man”: The ten fastest growing economies in 2001-
2010 and 2011-2015 
2001-2010 2011-2015 
Angola 11.1 China 9.5 
China 10.5 India 8.2 
Myanmar 10.3 Ethiopia 8.1 
Nigeria 8.9 Mozambique 7.7 
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Ethiopia 8.4 Tanzania 7.2 
Kazakhstan 8.2 Vietnam 7.2 
Chad 7.9 Congo 7.0 
Mozambique 7.9 Ghana 7.0 
Cambodia 7.7 Zambia 6.9 
Rwanda 7.6 Nigeria 6.8 
Source: The Economist (London), 6 January 2011 
Note: African countries are highlighted in bold.  
A number of caveats have to be made when referring to this projection: It is purely 
based on IMF forecasts of growth rates of the gross domestic product. The listed 
economies start from low levels of economic development, and the projections say 
nothing about sustainability, political risks for investors, or what the growth rates are 
based on; often, they will be based on raw material extraction and export – levels of 
economic diversification are not considered. Nor is this a projection about 
development impact with regard to per capita income growth or wealth distribution. 
The projections are thus no reason for complacency with regard to the state of 
development in Africa. Yet the growth perspective is impressive in itself, might help 
to reiterate the image of Africa as “the doomed continent”2, and might actually be 
used for development.  
The “lion kings” – if we continue using this label – are often economies with high 
levels of Chinese engagement. Can we thus rush to the conclusion that their growth 
is due to the China factor? An alternative interpretation would be that China – more 
precisely: Chinese enterprises – were quicker in detecting economic potential. They 
might well particularly engage precisely because these countries start to develop their 
potentials, make for lucrative markets and provide opportunities for Chinese 
enterprises and entrepreneurs. This would be the inverse causality. Other actors are 
also investing and lucrative sectors are often discussed: resource extraction and 
telecommunication are certainly among them; in these sectors, we see international 
competition about African market shares (see CCS Weekly Briefing, numerous 
editions). What is safe to say is that China is currently adding in achieving the growth 
rates and we will discuss elements of the Chinese contribution – which is direct and 
indirect – further below. “In the short term”, as Taylor argues, China‟s trade with and 
                                                             
2 This assessment of the “African lion kings” came a few years after Africa was written off 
as “The lost continent” in a cover story by the very same magazine.  
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investment in Africa will help the development of the continent, as it provides 
needed and additional funding (2011: 130). 
What about in the longer-term perspective? The time dimension might impact on 
how we answer the question on Chinese responsibilities. It will, in any case, impact 
on the recommendations that need to be made to decision-makers. Does Chinese 
investment seek quick benefits and will it have little sustainable positive impact? The 
story of quick closure of mines in DRC during the economic crisis was picked up 
upon in the media, but it did not seem to have been the general trend for Chinese 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in Southern Africa (cf. van der Lugt et al. 2011). This 
is a positive indication, but we should be careful to base positive long-term 
projections for the entire continent and all sectors of the economies on this 
observation.  
When making statements about prospective developments, it is helpful to remind 
ourselves of lessons from the past. For experiences with investment and growth 
without development, the case of Liberia might be illustrative. In her autobiography, 
today‟s Liberian President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf recalls that in the 1940s and 1950s, 
Liberia grew tremendously due to American investment by Firestone in its rubber 
production: “growth in production and income [was] averaging around 15 percent a 
year in nominal terms and 10 percent in real terms. Only Japan experienced greater 
growth during the same period” (Johnson-Sirleaf 2010: 51). This might sound 
familiar in the light of “the lion kings” label, mentioned above. However, Johnson-
Sirleaf deplores, structural deficiencies were not addressed, and “profits flowed out 
of Liberia as swiftly as the natural resources upon which they were based” (ibid.). 
Consequently, few Liberians benefitted from the growth: created jobs were mostly 
unskilled labour and investments in infrastructure mostly served the businesses of the 
investors without greater effects on the country.  
Sustainability and structural issues remain a concern for African economies – 
whatever the nationality of the investor. Chinese, like European or American or 
other, companies invest in order to make a benefit, not because they aim at national 
development. It is a task for African government to create and reinforce the 
framework conditions so that foreign investment, be it American, European or 
Chinese, does operate for the greater benefit of the country (cf. Mills 2010; van der 
Lugt 2011; Ajakaiye 2006).  
China is quickly gaining ground as an important potential ally to African states, not 
least so economically as an investor. Chinese investment can unlock some potential 
in African economies and adds to positive news. It also comes with challenges of its 
own, given the structure of Chinese actors. Consequently, Chines economic and 
political engagement and its social and environmental impact merit attention – but 
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not paranoia or salvation fantasies – by academics, policy-makers, civil society and 
economic actors in Africa. 
CHINESE -AFRICAN RELATIONS –  IDEOLOGY PREVAILS UNTIL THE 1970S  
Impressive growth rates in trade relations and others make for public attention and 
might seem as an entirely new engagement. This is not the case. China is not a „new 
kid on the block‟, neither in Africa nor in the world economy more broadly. The 
aspect is also emphasised by a recent Chinese White Paper on aid, which highlights 
the development of China‟s aid policy in the second half of the 20th century (GoC 
2011). Three phases in the engagement of modern China can be detected: Maoist 
China until the late 1970s with its „revolutionary‟ engagement, the reform period until 
the late 1990s, and the current rise after 1998 with the Chinese „going out‟ strategy 
(cf. Grimm et al. 2011: 64-65). This is might not be the full historical span of Chinese 
interactions with Africa. This paper is deliberately ignoring 15th century encounters, 
as reference to these encounters have a political purpose (see box 1), but are 
irrelevant for our exploration of Chinese responsibilities for current African 
developments.  
Box 1: The references to historical Sino-Africa encounters 
Africa as a continent was not unknown to the Chinese empire in history; in fact, Chinese 
arrived on the continent before European sailors did. The travels of Admiral Zhang He to 
Eastern Africa in the 15th century are an impressive example of Chinese technical 
supremacy at the time. The size of vessels used and the size of the overall fleet that 
explored South East Asia and the Indian ocean rim were far more technically advanced 
than the – in comparison rather pitiful – ships of the Portuguese or subsequent Dutch 
„explorers‟.  
In official contacts between Chinese and Africans, these travels during the Ming dynasty are 
referred to as a symbol for continuity and peacefulness in interactions. The travels were 
indeed not intended as a „colonisation‟ of other countries, if we understand colonisation as 
a forceful submission of territories. Tribute to the Chinese emperor, however, was expected 
in the form of recognition and gifts (at this occasion, we have first sources reporting of a 
giraffe sent to the court in China and triggering amazement in Beijing).  
Secondly, the reference to these early encounters provides some historical continuity and 
thus highlights early Chinese experiences, indirectly renouncing that China is „the 
newcomer‟ to Africa. 
A third, and presumably rather unintended, interpretation would highlight the 
overwhelming importance of internal factors in China for the country‟s international 
aspiration: The early travels were propelled by curiosity and expansionism in China – and 
were aborted, because China turned inwards after internal turmoil and a change of dynasty.  
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The symbolic value of these early contacts might be well understood. The actual link to 
current relations, however, is obviously constructed to form a coherent narrative. Needless 
to say that interaction in the 20th and 21st century is of a very different quality – in both 
breadth and in scope.  
 
Modern Sino-African relations date back to the foundation of the People‟s Republic 
of China, as is often emphasised. Yet, the Africa policy under Mao was motivated 
mostly by ideological drivers (assisting independence movements and supporting 
guerrilla movements in then colonies), seeing a slump in activities during the Chinese 
cultural revolution and the beginning of internal reforms under Deng Xiaoping in the 
mid-1970s (cf. Grimm et al. 2011). Along with these historical changes, we can see 
some older variants of the story of China in Africa in the early 1970s, with illustrative 
assessments that ring an often familiar bell with regard to today‟s debates.  
In 1974, for instance, Ogunsanwo looked into the Chinese Africa policy during the 
post-indendence years in Africa until shortly after the cultural revolution in China 
(1958-1971). He analysed the relationship from an African perspective, already 
stating back then that “Chinese policy in Africa does not of course operate in a 
vacuum. Its objectives, aspirations and the implementation or achievements of these 
necessarily interact not only with the parallel and often rival efforts of the United 
States and the Soviet Union, but also with the policy choices and aspirations of the 
African states” (Ogunsanwo 1974: ix). Ogunsanwo describes individual projects such 
as a cotton mill in Tanzania or the railway link between Lusaka and Daressalam 
(TAZARA railway), and also analyses the hostile environment to Chinese endeavours 
and the various setbacks, e.g. overthrow of partner governments in the first wave of 
coup d‟etats in Africa and the attempts of the Chinese leadership to avoid the loss of 
their investment, e.g. in Ghana with the overthrow of President Kwame Nkrumah or 
in the Central African Republic with the overthrow of President Daniel Dacko 
(Ogunsanwo 1974: 183ff.).3 The levels of engagement of the 1960s and 1970s were 
substantially scaled down after some setbacks in the engagements (for instance, 
supporting the „wrong‟ – i.e. unsuccessful – faction in the Angolan liberation war). 
The most important factor in substantially scaling down engagement was, however, 
                                                             
3 For other examples, see: Bailey (1975) on Sino-Tanzanian cooperation in African Affairs. 
Larkin (1971) provides a foreign policy analysis of Sino-African relations between 1949 
and 1970. „China and the Third World‟ was the title of a book by Harris/Worden (1986), 
analyzing China‟s role as possible „leader‟ of the third world. A brief overview of these 
early writings can also be found in Large (2008). 
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internal upheaval in China in the wake of the „cultural revolution‟ (cf. Grimm et al. 
2011). 
CHINA RE -ENGAGES -  CURRENT DEBATES AND PERCEPTION 
MANAGEMENT  
The debate on China‟s Africa engagement and its role in African growth and 
development has gained new vigour, also in academia, since the Chinese „go out‟ 
strategy. Since the late 1990s, Chinese enterprises are encouraged to engage in 
business beyond China. The move was further emphasised by Beijing‟s accession to 
the World Trade Organisation in 2001, which has opened new markets to Chinese 
investors. The latest push to the debate has come with the global economic crisis in 
2008/09, which emerging economies have mastered better than industrialised 
countries. During the crisis, investment in African states has – like anywhere in the 
world – contracted. However, the investments from emerging economies in Africa 
(not least so from China) have contracted less than those of Western countries, as 
research by the Centre for Chinese Studies at Stellenbosch University and by others 
has shown (cf. van der Lugt et al. 2011, Humphrey 2011). China is thus gaining 
global weight more quickly than previously assumed. It is now projected that China 
will surpass the US economy by 2016, even by previously very cautious institutions 
like the IMF (see CCS Weekly Briefing of 29 April 2011).  
China‟s gain of global influence can be understood as a regaining of weight and a 
rectification of historical injustice rather than an entirely new development (see box 
2). The conditions under which this comparative level of economic development 
(and subsequently: power) is regained – and under which it is used – are different in a 
setting of economic globalization.  
In the 21st century, economic value-chains span across countries and continents, and 
social interactions between humankind from diverse origin have reached 
unprecedented levels; changes in one (weighty) part of the world thus cause concern 
in others. Much of the at times aggressive political debate in the US can (and should) 
be attributed to internal political competition; it is clearly political polemics and 
obvious nonsense to argue that China‟s rise was only possible because it was 
tolerated by one or the other „inactive‟ US administration. What would have been the 
option – or the moral justification for any action to prevent Chinese from aspiring to 
a living standard comparable to developed countries?! 
Box 2: China is regaining its global economic weight 
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It might be hardly a surprising fact that a country which comprises around 20% of the 
world‟s population (with 1.3 billion inhabitants) is increasing its share in the world economy 
from currently 12% in global GDP. The figure actually shows the current lack behind 
Western economies, and it is difficult to perceive any moral justification for renouncing 
Chinese (or Africans, for that matter) to enjoy similar levels of development to Europe or 
North America. 
To many Chinese, China‟s economic rise is not a new development, but rather a 
rectification of an abnormal period of weakness. The 19th and 20th century position, in this 
long-term understanding, was an interruption in what China – the Middle Kingdom – saw 
as its rightful position for centuries. Indeed, China is regaining its historical strength, if we 
consider its mere share in the world economy.  
According to economic historians, until 1820, the Chinese GDP was estimated to be much 
higher than that of Europe (Western and Eastern) and the USA at the time combined. The 
estimates by the British economist Angus Maddison indicated for 1820 a value of 228,600 
million USD for China, compared with 197,305 million USD for Western, Eastern Europe 
and the US combined. The value is given in international dollars, purchasing power parity in 
value of 1990 (cf. Maddison 2007; also: Li 2007).  
 
However, the aspiration to the current level of resource-use by developed nations is 
indeed a problem, as it would be globally unsustainable. Not least environmental 
effects of activities are felt globally – and the development path based on carbon fuel 
is increasingly questioned. Changes in the economy – and, not to forget: adjustments 
in the way of life – will have to be made in developed countries (the OECD world). 
Developing countries have to face the additional challenge to not simply copy 
development models. They will have to find new, innovative paths, and this is 
particularly true for populous nations such as China, but also India, Brazil, Indonesia, 
Nigeria, and others. 
The changes coming with China‟s economic rise are indeed global in scope in that 
they affect all regions and countries in the world; not least Western powers becoming 
increasingly defensive. Ignoring the direct and indirect effects in the world of the 21st 
century is no longer an option. The Chinese leadership is thus cautiously trying to 
manage the ascent; it takes external anxiety into consideration when speaking about 
„peaceful rise‟ (cf. Guo 2006) or, more lately „a harmonious world‟ that the country is 
striving for (cf. Blanchard 2008). Likewise, the emphasis on still being a developing 
country can be understood as „expectation management‟ towards the developing 
world with regard to the level of support provided by Beijing (GoC 2011) – and as an 
attempt to appear smaller and less threatening than a more assertive appearance 
might be. 
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The attempts to manage and the rhetoric used indicate a sense of responsibility in the 
Chinese leadership. With regard to African development, the responsibility, however, 
needs to be looked into in more detail than just referring to the supposed „eye-level 
partnership‟, as will be argued in the following section.  
 
FOUR ELEMENTS IN CHINESE RESPONSIBILITY IN 
AFRICA 
When discussing the Chinese impact on Africa‟s development, there are a number of 
questions to ask about the precise understanding of the term „impact‟, not least so its 
time horizon and the dimensions it covers with regard to sustainability. The debate 
on Chinese impact on Africa‟s development covers various agendas: in economics, in 
political sciences, in environmental studies, in socio-cultural debates. Furthermore, 
both the action and inaction of any global powers has consequences for other, not 
least so: smaller, states and economies and consequently draws interest (cf. OECD 
forthcoming; Reisen 2010).   
This paper will thus look at the Chinese engagement in four aspects. First, China‟s 
engagement has a very immediate dimension of projects conducted by or on behalf 
of Chinese state organs in African states. Secondly, there are people-to-people 
interactions, many of which are beyond state influence or state volition. Thirdly, 
China‟s growth is of a magnitude that besides the direct engagement in Africa, it will 
have indirect impact on African development. Demand for raw materials is a key 
example. And fourthly, the indirect effects also include impact on discourses, as will 
be argued in a fourth step.  
STATE-TO-STATE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN  CHINA AND AFRICA  
Sino-African cooperation is based on bilateral and multilateral agreements, not unlike 
Africa‟s cooperation with other states. It does, however, have some distinct features 
that need to be considered. First and foremost, aid is often provided in package 
deals, including trade and investment elements. 
Relatively little can be said in precise figures about Chinese aid, as accounting is not 
identical to Western aid figures. In early 2011, the Chinese government published a 
White Paper on Aid (GoC 2011), which, even if disappointing in some aspects, 
provides a policy framework and some references (see box 3). Chinese development 
cooperation was estimated to have been around USD 1.5 billion in 2008. Projects in 
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African countries included infrastructure construction, engagement in the health 
sector, agricultural cooperation and various other aspects (Grimm et al. 2011; 
Brautigam 2009).  
Box 3: China’s White Paper on Aid 
“The Chinese government published a white paper on its aid policy on 21 April. The 
white paper provides some definitions of Chinese aid modalities and gives overall figures 
of how much is spent, on which continent, in which sector and according to income 
group of partner countries. […] the paper hardly offers reasons for government‟s policy 
choices, and unfortunately, the unique selling point of Chinese cooperation is not fleshed 
out. 
The paper […] provides broad lines and explains policy choices. Yet, the paper falls short 
of this expectation. Interest free loans, we learn, “are mainly provided to developing 
countries with relatively good economic conditions” – what are these „good conditions‟? It 
does list past interventions and, for example, states that volunteers have been dispatched 
to “19 developing countries, including Thailand, Ethiopia […], Seychelles, Liberia and 
Guyana.” This is more than we knew before – but what are the criteria for this choice of 
countries? Policy choices and the use of instruments by country are not systematically 
explained. This presumably is for a reason, as it could result in cross-country comparison 
and „beauty contests‟ between governments on levels of Chinese aid. This is 
understandable as a policy stance – but not quite the expected function of a White Paper. 
The paper states upfront that China is still “a developing country with a low per capita 
income and a large poverty-stricken population”. Not surprisingly, it continues: “China‟s 
foreign aid falls into the category of South-South cooperation and is mutual help between 
developing countries” – in other words: it is not at pair with Western aid. Yet, it is 
interesting how the paper carefully walks the line between referring to key terms of 
Western aid (comparative advantage, capacity building…) while repeatedly dissociating 
itself from Western concepts. However, what the paper does not clarify is how much of 
the „mutual‟ gain is to fall on either side, so that win-win-situations find the balance 
between the two extremes of purely altruistic aid and mere export promotion. 
The best „selling-point‟ for Chinese aid (namely: the package deals of aid, trade, and 
investment) does not feature, unfortunately. What we get is a section on „complete 
projects‟ [read: turnkey projects], said to account for 40% of Chinese aid. How these 
contribute to the stated goal of self-reliant development, however, is unclear – they could 
actually create dependencies. Why choose this modality? The case for them needs to be 
made. The paper states that “China never uses foreign aid as a means to interfere in 
recipient countries‟ internal affairs or seek political privileges for itself”. Yet, by providing 
certain levels of aid, any external actor does interfere to some degree […].” 
Source: Published as CCS Commentary by the author under the title “China’s aid policy white paper: Transparency 
now?” on 5 May 2011, cf. www.sun.ac.za/ccs  
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The projects are planned and conducted with Chinese state funding, some of which 
granted bilaterally, some in the form of (concessional and non-concessional) loans, 
and some agreed upon in a rather multilateral setting, the Forum for China-Africa 
Cooperation (FOCAC). The latter is in place since 2000 and holds summit meetings 
every three years, alternating between Chinese and African locations (cf. 
Paruk/Shelton 2008). Data is not systematically collected across all Chinese agencies, 
nor is it published by recipient country.   
On overseas investments, as opposed to aid, statistics are available, published by 
Chinese government departments, also on country-to-country basis. As Sanfilippo 
states in an overview: “Official statistics from the Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM) show that Chinese OFDI is distributed unevenly around the world, 
since the bulk of it goes to neighboring [sic!] countries in Asia (especially Hong 
Kong) and Latin America (mainly to offshore centers [sic!] such as the Virgin and 
Cayman Islands). The rest, according to such statistics is more or less equally 
distributed among the other continents, with Africa having received a larger share of 
outflows over the last few years” (Sanfilippo 2011). These statistics, however, do not 
always match those of the receiving country, as van der Lugt et al. (2011) noted.4 It 
also has to be taken into account that the overall figure of FDI includes state-owned 
enterprises as well as private companies. FDI figures thus do not unequivocally 
reflect state-to-state relations.  
Chinese finance, used for investment in, say, a mining company in the DRC – will, 
like any other investment, create (measurable) employment opportunities and might 
have positive impact on skills if it comes with training measures. If the investment is 
large scale, it is likely to conducted by a state-owned enterprise (i.e. central or 
provincial government owned) and likely to be accompanied by state funding, e.g. 
concessional loans for upgrading the infrastructure. All of this can create benefits for 
local communities and the national economy.  
When discussing Chinese responsibilities regarding the state-to-state relations, we 
have to be aware that impact can be both positive and negative; in the case of China, 
                                                             
4 One reason for this will be the inclusion (or not) of Hong Kong as a separate entity into 
trade statistics. Funds might be transferred (invested) to Hong Kong, from which 
investment is conducted. These investment would, in this case, not be counted as Chinese, 
but as originating from Hong Kong (as a special administrative zone of China). 
19 
 
this simple truth seems often forgotten in political debates. 5 Engagement might have 
negative effects, even if unwanted – for instance on the environment if standards are 
too low or not enforced, and it might result in the loss of employment in other, 
competing enterprises, or have other negative effects on some parts of the 
population that base their livelihood on natural resources. In this context, we should 
also highlight that state-owned enterprises are autonomous units in which the 
government usually does not interfere in their day-to-day running of business (cf. 
Bosselhard 2008: 7). This does not exempt the Chinese government from 
responsibility, as interactions with state agencies are numerous in the process of 
foreign investment (cf. Bosselhard 2008; also: van der Lugt et al. 2011); the line of 
causality for responsibility, however, will be longer that often presented.  
Effects at the local level – and responsibilities for them – can be detected and 
analysed, even if the overall balance at the national or even continental balance is 
more difficult to establish. A number of studies have mapped the engagement of 
China in African countries or sectors of the economy of an African country (cf. for 
instance: Jansson et al. 2009; Sandrey/Erdinger 2009; Asche/Schueller 2008). 
Zambia is a country case that is particularly well researched (as two examples, e.g. 
Mwanawina 2008; Kopinski/Polus 2011). Reports have also started to look into the 
promises made by China at the Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and 
have assessed their implementation (CCS 2009); for the next FOCAC meeting in 
2012, the task will be similar for researchers.  
Yet, when it comes to the question about impact, a key question is around the time 
horizon. For the respective African state, the investment will provide some 
immediate revenue that may or may not be used for development. It might also come 
with intermediate environmental, economic or political costs, too, if local 
communities need to be compensated.6 Will (foreign/Chinese) engagements result in 
future losses that outweigh the immediate gains? Does the investment have long-
term costs (e.g. deindustrialisation of Africa or environmental deterioration) that will 
need to be addressed at high costs at a later point, which actually changes the long-
term calculation? In fact, costs of the current engagement might be externalised (to 
                                                             
5 Le Pere (2007) added an illustrative dichotomy in the subtitle of a book he edited on 
China in Africa: “Mercantilist predator, or partner in development?”, using the open 
question as a means not draw too simple conclusions in the title. Similarly, Ajakaiye 
(2006) speaks of opportunities and challenges.  
6 It even might create long-term costs if communities are not compensated, albeit in a 
longer time frame: the affected populations might become alienated from the state and 
consequently limit their engagement for the common good, for instance. 
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be paid by a third party – possibly by Western aid as a „repair service‟) or they might 
be pushed onto future generations, limiting their aspirations. As illustrated above 
with the reference to Liberia‟s experience through the eyes of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, 
investments might have little long-term effects in overcoming poverty in a society.   
These considerations will have to be included in negotiations about win-win-
situations, if the mutual gain is supposed to be sustainable. When engaging in an 
unequal relationship like the one between China and African states, a case needs to 
be continuously made for the African side of supposed „win-win-situations‟. This is a 
continuous challenge for African politicians, whose task it is to enable African 
economic and social gains and formulate political goals and economic targets. 
Governments thus have to define their interests. Impact, however, does not stop at 
hindsight and with immediate interactions between two state parties. In other words, 
African government will have to come up with strategic choices guided by longer-
term visions. 
The attribution of primary responsibility to African governments, however, is not a 
complete whitewash from responsibility on the Chinese side. Given the often stark 
power inequality between China and African countries, it is partly also the 
responsibility of the Chinese government to ensure that gains are on both sides. 
Otherwise, the talk of win-win is an inexpensive rhetorical figure. Scholars have 
argued that China can indeed be responsive to African policy complaints (cf. Ajakaiye 
2006: 10). The Chinese government White Paper on Trade and Investment in Africa 
of December 2010 can be interpreted as a response to lessons learnt in Africa. For 
the first time, it includes a section on the need for capacity building in Africa on how 
best to use opportunities, thereby acknowledging inequalities and insufficiencies in 
the relationship (GoC 2010).  
DIFFERENTIATION OF ACTORS -  INDIVIDUALS AND THEIR IMPACT  
Sino-African relations are not all exclusively about governments. Foreign relations – 
including Chinese engagement in Africa – like those international relations of other 
actors (cf. Hill 2002), do become increasingly differentiated and complex. Questions 
about Chinese impact will also have to look beyond state-to-state interactions. The 
impact of private economic interaction on African societies can in some instances be 
felt heavily, and migration as well as the role of the diaspora are aspects to be 
considered.  
The Chinese economic rise comes with personal interactions, driven by the individual 
search for the „new frontier‟. Chinese entrepreneurs are innovative, highly agile, and 
they are actively searching new markets for their products. This includes a search for 
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markets beyond China itself, including Africa, which can lead to the creation of a 
diaspora of Chinese in Africa (see box 4).  
Box 4: Chen (2011) on Chinese migration in South Africa 
“Johannesburg has the largest population and highest density of Chinese in South Africa. It 
is estimate that there are about 300,000 Chinese migrants in South Africa, and more than 
200,000 Chinese migrants do business in Johannesburg.  
The new Chinese migrants tend to sell a wide range of cheap Chinese-made textiles, often 
to the lowest end of the consumer market in South Africa. […] In addition to these retail 
China shops and businesses, several larger South African cities have become home to 
Chinese wholesale traders, such as Johannesburg, Cape Town, and Durban. The largest […] 
in Johannesburg […] form a regional shopping hub which provides goods not just for 
South Africans but also to retailers and consumers in neighbouring countries (Botswana, 
Lesotho, Zimbabwe, and Angola) and from across Africa. […] 
Most of the pre-2000 migrants from China‟s mainland were from Beijing and Shanghai. 
Many of them worked in the state-owned enterprises. At the end of their two to three years 
contract periods some of these Chinese decided to stay in South Africa. Often, the reason 
given for staying on in South Africa was that income in South Africa was higher than what 
they received in China. Amongst those who chose to remain in South Africa, most are 
educated professionals, and are now some of the most successful business people in their 
communities with established extensive business networks throughout the southern Africa 
region and in China. The majority of them entered into import, retail and wholesale trading 
as well as manufacturing of consumer products. […] 
The post-2000 wave of Chinese migration, which continues today, is comprised 
predominantly of small traders and/or peasants from Fujian province. Based on our 
research it would appear that many entered the country illegally from neighbouring African 
countries and subsequently applied for asylum-seeker status and work permits. Due to their 
limited English, low levels of education, and their lack of extensive business networks and 
social capital, they tend to run small shops in the remote towns across South Africa. […]  
Traditionally, Fujianese emigrated to South Asia, America, Japan and Britain. But in recent 
years, the pattern has changed. Traditional Western host countries continue to implement 
more restrictive immigration laws and tighten control of their borders through new 
surveillance technology. In South Asia, the economies. performances were declining. 
Consequently, Fujianese sought alternative destinations, such as Russia, Argentina and 
South Africa. South Africa.s opening up process through the mid-1990s and its renewed 
diplomatic relationship with the People.s Republic of China in 1998 provided tremendous 
investment and business opportunities. With its established business and physical 
infrastructure and its lower threshold for entry, South Africa has become an attractive 
migration destination, particularly for those with insufficient qualifications or insufficient 
capital to qualify for entry to North America, Europe, or Australia.  
It is said that if a Fujianese wanted to go to America, he or she would spend more than 400 
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000 RMB (approx. US$ 60 000) to go there. To enter South Africa, the amount of 40 000 
RMB (just over US$ 6000) is enough. [… The] perception is that there are plenty of 
opportunities [in South Africa]; if one has enough capital, one can run a shop or starts other 
types of business easily. Consequently, in Fujian province especially in Fuqing city, more 
and more people made the choice to immigrate to South Africa instead of other countries. 
[…] The vast majority of new Chinese migrants to South Africa have made personal (and 
family) decisions to leave their homes in search of greener pastures and opportunities to 
improve their lives and the lives of their children. Newer migrants tend to follow paths cut 
by those who came earlier. […]” 
Source: Chen Fenglan (2011): “Chinatown in Johannesburg - A Social Survey”, in: China Monitor 61: “New Silk 
Roads: African and Chinese traders in Southern China and South Africa”, Stellenbosch, April 2011, pp. 8-11.  
 
More often than not, the presence of Chinese engineers or small traders is taken as 
evidence for an official Chinese policy to engage with Africa. While there is, indeed, 
active encouragement of the government in Beijing to “go out” and invest abroad, 
motivations for migration will be individual, and are directed by a combination of 
factors, comprising easiness of access, prospects for wealth creation, living 
conditions, presence of a diaspora in place, etc.  In this regard, migration of Chinese 
to South Africa has similarities to other migration patterns. 
While these interpersonal relations are not directly governed by central state actors, 
they cannot always be dissociated from the broader picture of economic or political 
relations. At the individual level, African and Chinese citizens are exposed to 
different societies and more global interconnectedness. This direct engagement of 
individuals, too, has broader repercussions; it creates personal opportunities as well 
as challenges. Competition is becoming more direct between various groups in small-
trader communities or on the labour market. This does not least so concern working 
conditions and standards/legislation in place. The stiffer competition by Chinese 
enterprises and individuals might result in pressure on social or environmental 
standards. In this competition, individuals might overstep legal lines or – in larger 
numbers – put pressure on legal frameworks, as the media often covers. 7  This 
dimension offers various aspects for research (for an overview on Chinese migration 
                                                             
7 As an example, see reporting on Chinese in Namibia in The Sunday Times, South Africa, 
of 27 March 2011. 
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to Africa, see for instance Park/Hyunh 2010) and requires more attention and 
research on the respective diaspora.8 
Perceptions matter and prejudices, stereotypes and xenophobia (both in China and in 
African countries) are deplorable phenomena inherent in human relations. If negative 
perceptions become too dominant, they can – indirectly – backfire on political and 
economic relations between countries. Reactions to stiff local competition can create 
social tensions, not least so outbreaks of xenophobic reactions, as could be witnessed 
in a number of countries in Africa. Zambia, in this regard, is a case, and possibly and 
early case (cf. Kopinski/Polus 2011) – but most likely far from being the only case.  
The responsibility for managing these relations is both on the Chinese side and with 
African societies. African governments will have to address issues in law enforcement 
on immigration laws as well as labour or environmental standards. China‟s increasing 
investment in „soft power‟ – e.g. with Confucius Institutes mushrooming throughout 
Africa – gives an indication of Chinese official concern about the image of China in 
Africa and elsewhere. Some, rather indirect, effects of China‟s global rise, however, 
are even more difficult to manage.  
INDIRECT EFFECTS OF CHINESE GROWTH  
China‟s global economic competitiveness can mean stiffer competition when African 
produce is sold to third markets (the EU or the US or elsewhere). Chinese produce 
could thus be regarded as having a negative impact on domestic infant industries in 
African countries. In most cases, the competition in third markets might de facto be 
rather a story about potential or about (reduced) prospects for future African trade. 
It might, however, also hit a nascent industry. The story about effects of Chinese 
mass production on the then nascent African textile industry in the early 2000s has 
been explored by a number of researcher institutions (see e.g. Asche/Schueller 2008, 
Kaplinsky et al. 2006).  
The economic effects – Stimulating structural change or not? 
The assessment of the effects will differ between researchers, based on the respective 
school of thought that is followed. Market liberals could regard Chinese engagement 
with negative effects on local industries as some sort of Schumpeterian „creative 
                                                             
8 There are two dimensions to the issue of Sino-African diaspora: Africans in China, 
Chinese in Africa. For overview assessements of the situation in Guangzhou/China and 
Johannesburg/South Africa, see China Monitor 61 of April 2011. 
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destruction‟, and thus a way to modernize African economies. 9  Others, with a 
different sense of the state‟s role in industrialisation, would take a different angle, and 
rather describe Chinese competition as unfair, with a subsequent call to re-balance it 
in order to avoid the creation of new dependencies. In any case, however, China‟s 
rise is of different quality than the ascent of, say Japan in the 1970s or South Korea 
in the 1980s. China‟s rise has broader, global repercussions with intermediate effects 
on Africa that need to be considered. China‟s rise comes with broader challenges in 
the political realm.  
Figure 1: Price indices for selected energy and commodity products 
Reproduced from Humphrey 2010: 20 
 
China has a „big size effect‟ that other emerging economies do not have and that 
those in the past did not have (cf. Kaplinsky/Messner 2007). This „big size effect‟ 
leads to intermediate effects on African states, economies, and societies. Even if 
there were not a single Chinese person in Africa, China would feature in African 
economic policy. Admittedly, the absence of Chinese from Africa is highly unlikely. 
The point of this argument, though, is that Chinese growth requires energy and raw 
                                                             
9 One example of the first vision could be found in the presentation of a Chinese scholar 
when he presented on Chinese development experiences in a meeting of the China DAC 
Study Group in Addis Ababa in March 2011: he highlighted competition as a means to 
have more competitive enterprises for the international market, without duly 
acknowledging that the non-competitive Chinese enterprises do not survive competition 
within China. 
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materials – and more so than China disposes of domestically. Chinese demand for 
coal, metal ore or timber has led to a steep increase in world market prices for these 
products, with high price peaks in 2008. If the prices of 2005 are taken as the 
baseline, commodity prices10 in early 2008 were two and a half times higher than in 
2005. And they were still 50% higher after the economic crisis than before it (see 
Figure 1 above). 
This is overall good news for African producer countries like Angola, Nigeria, or 
Equatorial-Guinea. It is less good news for non-producer countries like Senegal, Kenya, 
and others. The answers on what the Chinese impact is on Africa will thus have to be 
differentiated and needs to be discussed by country or by economic sector. For 
producer countries of raw materials, the demand of emerging economies and not 
least so from China will create windfall gains. This statement about the existence of 
windfall gains does, however, not make a statement about how these gains are used. 
An intermediate effect of China‟s rise and the subsequent hausse in raw material prices 
could lead to complacency among African elites – or squandering of resources – and 
result in African states missing the boat on reform requirements, as illustrated at the 
historical example of Liberia above (for an argument following this line across the 
African continent, see Mills 2010). It also bears the risk of „Dutch disease‟ effects on 
various African economies that will need to be counteracted (Ajakaiye 2006: 7).  
Not incentivising structural change in some countries might not to be blamed on 
Chinese investors in the first place, but it will most likely – over time – influence the 
overall assessment in retrospect of whether Chinese engagement has been a blessing 
to Africa or not. Does China facilitate economic change – not least the change 
towards green growth – or does it (even if involuntarily) create disincentives for 
moving away from an economy that is predominantly raw material and fossil fuel 
based and that is thus not resilient to external shocks and not sustainable? Asking 
this question already illustrates that China‟s big size effects are both a blessing and a 
headache also for China‟s decision-makers. Speaking of a „harmonious world‟, the 
Chinese government will need adequate action to make it happen – and some action 
might actually be harmful to Chinese producers or consumers. Balancing this is a 
challenge to Chinese policy makers (Blanchard 2008) – and it is, first and foremost, a 
task for African policy-makers who have to engage with a more complex and 
globalised world and, at the same time, have to manage social change in Africa.  
Environmental impact – indirect effects of Chinese legislation 
                                                             
10 Combined commodity prices for metals, crude oil and food, see Humphrey (2010). 
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Similar to other great powers, domestic policy changes within China and based on a 
predominantly domestic agenda arguably have repercussions for distant foreign 
destinations. Timber might be used as a case in point here. Due to stricter forest 
protection legislation in China itself as well as technological limitation in the ability to 
process cultivated wood, the supply of timber had to come in the form of large logs 
from abroad (cf. Kaplinsky et al. 2010: 319). The establishment of a furniture 
industry in China has led to a shift in the global value chain, leading to increasing 
needs for timber for manufacturing in China, as documented by Kaplinsky et al 
(2010). China‟s ascent to the role of „the world‟s manufacture‟ also in the furniture 
industry has led to drastically increasing trade in timber e.g. between Gabon and 
China. Timber and wood imports to China are coming inter alia from Gabon, Congo 
Brazzaville, Cameroon, and Equatorial Guinea, the overwhelming majority of which 
not logged in line with local laws, as NGO estimated (cf. Bosshard 2008: 8). At the 
same time, the Chinese government does improve the regulatory framework 
(„Guidelines on Sustainable Management of Overseas Forests for Chinese 
Enterprises‟), even if these guidelines might not be legally binding and 
implementation might be slower than desired (cf. Bosshard 2008); the Chinese 
government, in any case, is reacting to challenges and criticism in some instances, as 
can be illustrated with this example.   
Domestic legal frameworks and their respective enforcement as well as (still limited) 
levels of technology in Chinese industry thus have an intermediate effect on 
economic and environmental prospects in Central Africa. Another, and possibly the 
biggest, problem of global scale is China‟s CO2 emission that goes with its domestic 
growth. China‟s size results in a global responsibility for indirect effects that are 
difficult to control or manage, just like is the case for the US or the EU. Negative 
intermediate effects on other developing countries, arguably, are conflicting with the 
official presentation of China as just another developing country, aspiring to create a 
harmonious world. The internal tension does not go unnoticed in Beijing and is 
presumably one reason why FOCAC IV, the summit of Sharm-el-Sheikh in 2009, 
included the acknowledgement of a Chinese responsibility for climate change, even if 
“common but differentiated” (FOCAC IV 2009). It should also not be forgotten that 
since 2006, legal frameworks in China on renewable energy have improved 
substantially, encouraging a „greening‟ (and upgrading) of its economy. “China could 
be generating more electricity from renewables in 2020 than any other nation on 
earth” (Eisen 2011). This makes provisions in FOCAC and in bilateral cooperation 
particularly relevant; there is know-how to transfer.  
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CHINA ‟S IMPACT ON THE DEVE LOPMENT DISCOURSE  
Beyond these immediate and intermediate effects with economic, social and 
environmental consequences, China‟s presence also has political effects on the 
discourse around development. Parallel to a debate in Western development 
cooperation on how to improve aid effectiveness, enter the dragon with its gifts - to 
use the words of Brautigam (2010). It is somewhat ironic that the debate on aid 
effectiveness started at the same time that China‟s rise gave increasing breadth and 
depth to China‟s engagement in Africa. Mutual reinforcements of both trends are 
likely. 
Western development debates have gone through thematic cycles before having 
addressed reform needs in how policy is made. In a crude overview, topics debated 
and reflected in policies of donors ranged from state building in the 1960s, emphasis 
on social and rural development in the 1970s, notorious policies on structural 
adjustment in the 1980s, governance debates in the 1990s to the new paradigm for 
Western Aid: the Paris Declaration. The new post-Washington consensus of Western 
aid, if it may be called so, is rather procedural, with emphasis on „ownership‟, 
„partnership‟ and „alignment to African policies‟. This, of course, does not necessarily 
mean that Western practice is fully in line with its discourse – much like Chinese 
activities.   
Chinese engagement, for its part, deliberately mixes trade, aid, and investment, and 
often deliberately blurs the line between the three (cf. Grimm et al. 2011; Davies 
2008). Not least because of this mix, the assessment of Chinese engagement does not 
always correctly classify aid or foreign direct investment as such. With regard to FDI 
debates, Chinese companies often are neither acquiring shares in African companies 
nor do they establish joint ventures. Thus, in numerous instances China‟s 
engagement would be better described as trade (or a modern version of barter trade): 
infrastructure gets funded by China and constructed by Chinese companies in 
exchange for delivery of raw material (cf. Corkin/Burke 2006; on FDI: van der Lugt 
et al. 2011). The possibility to get infrastructure and repay with supplies in raw 
materials provides infrastructure at a time when other finance is not available. Banks 
might express doubts around financial sustainability, and Western donor agencies 
might raise political conditions, or overly lengthy procedures on the donor‟s side 
might make their support a distant prospect. Offers of Chinese engagement create 
new policy options in these circumstances.  
The activities by Chinese institutions, companies and individuals arguably also have 
some indirect effects on traditional partners‟ policies towards Africa. Some more 
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recent reoccurrences of issues on the Western aid agenda might have to do with 
practice (or perceptions) of Chinese policies. On their agendas for development 
cooperation, Western donors have rediscovered infrastructure, for instance. Likewise, 
agriculture is back on the agenda, after years of neglect, as can, not least, be seen with 
discussions on a new World Bank strategy since late 2010. The direct line to Chinese 
engagement, however, is not easy to establish. The (re)emergence of these topics can 
also be delayed effects of the New Partnership for Africa‟s Development (NEPAD). 
At the formulation of this framework, defined in 2001, there was little focus on 
China‟s Africa policy. Given the usual administrative time-lag when it comes to 
translating new agendas into actions, the current shift of foci is most likely a 
combination of the two drivers. Traditional development partners can thus be 
expected to be reacting to both, the African agenda and increased Chinese 
engagement, with some delay. And in some instances, engaging with China might be 
instrumental rather than genuine, i.e. highlighting the possible alternative China can 
be used as a tool to reengage with Europe or other partners on more beneficial terms 
(cf. Grimm/Hackenesch, forthcoming).  
One issue often evoked in discussion by Western observers on the Chinese impact 
on Africa is the assumed negative Chinese effect on governance standards (cf. 
Hackenesch 2011). China does not actively promote „good governance‟ as a goal in 
its Africa policy. Yet, if looking into lessons to learn from China, there are actually 
good arguments to consider „good governance‟ a key element for the Chinese policy 
success. Good governance does not equal democracy, and the term was deliberately 
established by the World Bank in 1989 to operate within the (rather technical) 
mandate of the bank (World Bank 1989; cf. also Santiso 2001). In the context of 
China, clear elements of good governance appear in assessment of its development 
successes (Ravaillon 2008): a development-oriented leadership with implementation 
capacity and a clear policy based on trial-and-error, in other words: evidenced based 
policy.  
Beyond indirect effects on Western partners‟ policies, China is in the debate as a 
„model‟ for development in Africa. The recommendation to follow the „China model‟ 
is rarely (if ever) used by Chinese actors, even if the lines of argument of Chinese 
successes implicitly suggest learning from China‟s experiences. The reference to „a 
model‟ would thus always have to evoke the question about intentions of the 
„learner‟, i.e. about the elements of particular interest. Do African government that 
speak about learning from the „China model‟, such as Zimbabwe‟s policy to „look 
east‟, have the development of their countries in mind? The appeal for a number of 
African governments might be in the combination of an authoritarian (one-party) 
state in combination with developmental progress. China, indeed, has liberalised its 
economy and its society – without allowing direct challenges of the political 
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monopoly of the Communist Party. In this theoretical debate, China‟s size is rather a 
negligible quantity and it should not be forgotten that in other countries, democratic 
regimes have led to development successes. Examining lessons to learn from Chinese 
policy experiences can be an interesting point of departure for comparative policy 
research, when solutions to specific problems are sought. This macro-debate, 
however, is not new and not exclusively linked China‟s economic rise; China is rather 
the latest addition to a reoccurring debate about „developmental states‟ (see, for 
instance, Fritz/Menocal 2007; Mkandawire 2001; Johnson 1999; Evans 1995).  
 
Conclusions 
With increasing clout at the global stage, China is also increasing its political stance in 
Africa. Even if one might have doubts about China‟s growth, it has to be admitted 
that the country, overall, has thus far managed its global rise well. 
However, the current narratives – both the Western and the Chinese – around 
Chinese responsibility in Africa do not fully capture current realities, a decade after 
the relations have started to grow substantially and when China is fast in catching up 
with Africa‟s traditional partners. Given the inequality of partners, China as the 
politically stronger partner, has additional responsibilities in the management of its 
Africa policy – and more so than the current self-presentation as „another developing 
country‟ suggests. Putting all the blame for Africa‟s trouble with Chinese investment 
at the doorsteps of the Chinese government, however, is even more offensive. It 
suggests that African governments are objects in the engagement, rather than 
subjects. And it assumes an all-powerful government in Beijing, which is equally 
misguiding.  
The research on the „global power China‟ is – and should – arguably become more 
comparable to other global powers. Looking at China specifically merits attention. 
Yet, more comparison would often benefit the quality of research, not least so 
precisely because the discussion around China‟s African engagement more often than 
not emphasises the distinctness or even uniqueness of Chinese cooperation with 
Africa, and this can only be checked against in comparison to other actors. Some 
Chinese debates will ring a bell to policy-makers elsewhere, as Lancaster (2007) nicely 
illustrates in her essay on the Chinese aid system with hints to discussions in the US 
administration in her assessment.  
Three fundamentals should be kept in mind when examining the increasing Chinese 
engagement in Africa in the 21st century:   
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First, China is gaining economic strength and political power – yet it still is a 
developing country with many internal challenges. Given these internal social 
tensions, environmental degradations or technological shortcomings in China, the 
Asian country will find it difficult to balance its direct engagement with the indirect 
(and possibly involuntary) effects on African states – even with the best of 
intentions.  
Secondly, the central government in Beijing does not control all external interactions 
of Chinese actors in Africa. China is not as easy a partner as it might seem, despite 
the initially appealing combination of aid, trade and investment, which seems to 
provide a „one-stop-partner‟ to African governments. Knowledge on Africa is not 
abundant in China and policies are arguably following the pragmatic motto of 
“feeling for the stones when crossing the river”, as Deng Xiaoping expressed it. 
Contrary to often read media coverage, it is unlikely that there is one master plan in 
Beijing that systematically includes the full spectrum of Chinese actors. Often 
discussed as „China‟ as if it were a monolithic block, the setting of actors from China 
varies across African countries. Some have more private company engagement or 
more state-to-state cooperation or have diaspora groups that are beyond state 
control. The sets of actors in countries will have to be analysed accordingly. 
And thirdly, but not least: with increasing investments and more Chinese actors on 
the ground, the stakes rise and consequently, China‟s interests in Africa grow and 
diversify. From a Chinese perspective the engagement is not meant to exclusively 
„help Africa‟, but it is part of the picture of China‟s global engagement. China‟s 
engagement is about its own positions, the Chinese economy, China‟s diplomatic 
clout, or simply individual pursuit of opportunities as in the case of migration. Win-
win-situations are the key phrase used, but it remains unclear how the shares of gains 
are distributed – and it is unclear how long-term costs are included in the calculation 
of gains. Often – not necessarily always – Chinese actors are explicit about an own 
agenda in their engagement with Africa. African states and interest groups will have 
to define and advocate for their own interests, not unlike the situation with 
„traditional partners‟. Unfortunately, these are elements in the relationship in which 
power inequalities arguably play out most. Arguments might have to be conducted 
with Beijing against domestic Chinese concerns (or, in „Western‟ terms, against a 
domestic lobby). Pushing this type of agenda has in the past been difficult for 
African states, for instance questions around how to overcome protectionism in 
agriculture when discussion with Europe. China is unlikely to be an exception in this 
regard. Reminding the Chinese authorities of their responsibilities will thus not be an 
easy task – even if a necessary one.  New points of engagement will have to be 
sought with an external partner who rejects Western standards (and Western 
rhetoric) in its engagement with other developing countries.  
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China‟s direct engagement does provide an opportunity for African states to 
overcome a focus on their traditional partners and diversify their external relations 
(diplomatically, economically, and culturally). China‟s engagement in Africa is much 
less of a part of a „scramble for Africa‟ as was the case in the aspirations for territorial 
control in the late 19th century. It is rather to be regarded as the attempt of an 
emerging economy to grasp the opportunities of globalization. In this context, 
China‟s global role has various indirect effects in trade, in export possibilities, or with 
regard to reforms of global institutions, that its impact on Africa merits a broad and 
diversified research agenda, as has been argued in this paper. The negative – and 
involuntary – effects of China‟s growth on African development will need to be 
managed by African states and regional organisations and by China itself.  
The Chinese government is not ignorant of its image in Africa or elsewhere; yet, it 
might be slow or inadequate in its responsiveness at times. Chinese rhetoric around 
its relationship with Africa can be understood as a diplomatic attempt to „soothing‟ 
over some „teething problems‟ in the relations and, in some instances, a glossing over 
of substantial differences in interests. African actors are thus well advised to invest in 
their understanding of Chinese engagement in Africa by also looking at domestic 
drivers for China‟s agenda to better understand its possible future evolution and 
adjust African policies accordingly. China clearly has a political responsibility for the 
behaviour of Chinese actors abroad. Yet, African policy makers have undoubtedly 
the prime responsibility to make use of opportunities and to pre-empt challenges.    
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